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Nudges that should fail?
AVISHALOM TOR*
Notre Dame Law School, Notre Dame, IN, USA and University of Haifa Faculty of Law, Haifa, Israel

Abstract: Professor Sunstein (2017) discusses the possible causes for and
policy implications of the failure of nudges, with special attention to defaults.
Though he focuses on nudges that fail when they should succeed, Sunstein
recognizes that some failures reveal that a nudge should not have been
attempted to begin with. ‘Nudges that fail’, however, does not consider fully
the relationship between the outcomes of nudging and their likely welfare
effects, most notably neglecting the troubling case of nudges that succeed
when they should fail. Hence, after clarifying the boundaries of legitimate
nudging within a libertarian-paternalistic approach and noting the fourfold
relationship between the efﬁcacy of nudging and its normative desirability,
this article evaluates more fully the case of failed nudges and examines the
hitherto unaddressed problem of successful yet undesirable nudges. This
analysis shows that the failure of nudging bears only limited diagnostic
value, while the success of a nudge is even less indicative of its normative
status. The article concludes with recommendations for policy-makers who
wish to employ nudges that are not only efﬁcacious, but also likely to
advance the subjective well-being of the individuals they target.
Submitted 27 November 2018; revised 28 January 2019;
accepted 11 February 2019

Professor Sunstein’s recent article in this journal entitled ‘Nudges that fail’
(2017) discusses some of the possible causes for and policy implications of
the failure of nudges, with a special focus on the paradigmatic case of
default rules. The article correctly notes that the failure of a nudge can result
from a variety of causes that, in turn, bear different policy implications,
from nudging more effectively, through avoiding the nudge altogether, to
replacing the attempted nudging with ‘harder’ interventions. The present analysis continues this examination, assessing more fully the relationship between
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the efﬁcacy of nudging and its potential for achieving its stated goal of advancing individuals’ subjective welfare or, more colloquially, of making people
better off according to their own lights (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; Tor, 2017).1
A two-by-two table (see Figure 1) illustrates the fourfold relationship
between a nudge’s success or failure and whether it should be attempted in a
given case. This simple framework makes clear that – as its title clearly indicates – Sunstein’s article considers only the right-hand column of the table:
the cells involving nudges that fail. The top-right cell concerns situations in
which nudging fails even though it is normatively desirable, because its
success would have advanced individuals’ subjective welfare. This type of
failure reveals the need to ﬁx the attempted nudge.
Thus, if the failed nudge was only technically deﬁcient, it merely needs to be
better designed. To illustrate, consider a company that ﬁnds the majority of its
employees opting out of a default contribution rate of 10% of their pretax
income (cf. Beshears et al., 2010), a default that the company adopted to
help increase the retirement savings of those employees who wish to do so.
This nudge might have failed due to some technical deﬁciency in its design,
such as the default contribution rate having been set too high. If this were
the case, employees would have found a better-designed default (e.g., a 6%
contribution rate) more attractive, with overall contribution levels increasing
and only a few employees opting out and further lowering their contribution
rates.
Sunstein also considers two situations in which a nudge’s failure places it in
our bottom-right cell. In the ﬁrst case, individuals’ subjective welfare can still
be improved by some other intervention, although no nudge would prove
adequate to the task. According to ‘Nudges that fail’, such inadequate
nudges should be replaced by ‘harder’ rules that diminish actors’ freedom of
choice (e.g., by changing economic incentives) or even deprive them of it
altogether (as when adopting mandates or bans). In the case of the failed
10% retirement contribution default, for instance, the argument might be
that if no default rate could bring employees to save as much as they wish to
save, some mandatory minimum contribution rate should be set instead.

1 Importantly, though the analysis here has implications for behavioral interventions based on
deontological, social welfare or traditional paternalistic grounds, it focuses on assessing libertarian–paternalistic nudges (Sunstein & Thaler, 2003) without addressing the legitimacy of the
former grounds for policy-making. To this end, and despite the limitations of such an approach,
the article follows the practice of mainstream economics, law and economics and public policy
research, which commonly equates subjective welfare with actual preferences (Hausman, 2012)
instead of drawing on other theories of well-being (Zamir, 1998).
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Figure 1. Nudge desirability and outcomes.
Inappropriate nudges – cases in which the failure of nudging is due to policymakers’ erroneous assessment of individuals’ preferences – also belong in the
bottom-right cell of Figure 1. Nudges cannot advance subjective welfare
when unbiased individuals make contrary choices based on their antecedent
preferences.2 For example, one ﬁeld study that manipulated the accessibility
of different types of bread in two Dutch supermarkets found no signiﬁcant
effect on customers’ propensity to purchase more versus less healthful types
of bread (de Wijk et al., 2016). While the failure of this particular nudge
might have reﬂected the weakness of the experimental manipulation (a mere
reordering of the presentation of most bread types within their usual aisle), it
could well have been due to the clear antecedent preferences of consumers,
who frequently shop for bread and are familiar with the available varieties.
The choices of those who prefer and routinely purchase white or wheat
bread, for instance, are unlikely to be affected by a minute change in their relative accessibility. Plausibly, the failure of this manipulation may simply reveal
that shoppers cannot be made subjectively better off by a nudge involving the
in-store location of different bread types. If this indeed were the case, policymakers seeking to promote individuals’ subjective welfare should have
avoided further nudging (or any alternative intervention) attempts.3
However, while ‘Nudges that fail’ begins the important task of identifying
different reasons for nudge failure, it stops short of explaining how one
might go about determining the cause of a given failure. Yet, without such a
determination, policy-makers would not be able to decide whether the

2 While interventions that transform people’s preferences sometimes may be justiﬁed (LehwinsonZamir, 2015), they are largely inapposite with an approach that aims to advance the satisfaction of
actual antecedent preferences (Sunstein, 2018a), though a full discussion of this question is outside the
scope of the present analysis.
3 Of course, those wishing to promote goals such as social welfare or even individuals’ objective
welfare might still wish to replace the nudge with harder regulatory tools (e.g., Bubb & Pildes, 2014).
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failure of a nudge should be endorsed or, instead, remedied. They would also
be unable to determine whether a failed nudge that requires remediation should
be replaced by a better nudge or by a more assertive policy instrument.
Even more problematically, Sunstein’s focus on failed nudges diverts attention from nudges that belong on the left-hand side of Figure 1 – namely, nudges
that succeed. The effective and desirable nudges of the top-left cell require no
further discussion. But the case is quite different with respect to those nudges
in the bottom-left cell that succeed when they should have failed. This category
thus concerns undesirable nudging that should never have taken place to begin
with, yet was successfully implemented.
The present article responds to these lacunae, examining how to determine
whether the failure of a nudge is diagnostic of its undesirability; whether a
failed yet-desirable nudge should be replaced by a better nudge or by
‘harder’ policy instruments beyond nudging; and, importantly, whether a successful nudge in fact should have failed. This inquiry shows that the failure of a
nudge often holds only limited diagnostic value. Moreover, the apparent
success of a nudge typically is even less informative than its failure. After
explaining the substantial challenges involved in correctly categorizing both
failed and successful nudges, this article concludes by outlining concrete recommendations for policy-makers wishing to employ efﬁcacious nudges that may
also advance individuals’ subjective welfare.

Goal and tools – the why and how of true nudging4
Recent years have seen a dramatic rise in the study and implementation of
behaviorally informed public policies (Shaﬁr, 2013). One important catalyst
for this development was the 2008 publication of Thaler and Sunstein’s
Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness (hereafter referred to as Nudge), which brought to international and popular
attention the developing academic discourse in this area. Indeed, Nudge
has been so successful that much of the wide-ranging work by scholars
and policy-makers over the decade since the book’s publication has been
referring to any and all behavioral public policies as ‘nudges’ (e.g.,
Halpern, 2015; Sibony & Alemanno, 2016).
However, the popularity of the nudge usage obscures an important aspect of
Thaler and Sunstein’s original deﬁnition of the term. As originally conceived,
nudges are one important class of behaviorally informed policies, distinct
4 This section draws on Tor (2016, 2017). Compare also the discussion of the ends and means of
behaviorally informed policies in Zamir and Teichman (2018).
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from other such interventions in combining the important yet limited policy
goal of improving individuals’ subjective welfare with a speciﬁc set of
liberty-preserving behavioral policy tools (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; Tor,
2016). This unique ‘libertarian-paternalistic’ combination of goal and tools
is the foundation of nudges’ claim for superiority to behavioral policies that
aim to advance other goals, such as social welfare, as well as to ‘harder’ paternalistic interventions (Sunstein & Thaler, 2003).5 To appreciate this distinction
and its relevance here, let us consider brieﬂy the goal of nudging and its tools.
Nudging is self-consciously paternalistic, proclaiming the goal of making the
individuals it targets better off. Yet Thaler and Sunstein make it clear that not
all traditionally paternalistic interventions count as nudges, only those aiming
at making people ‘better off, as judged by themselves’ (Thaler & Sunstein,
2008; Sunstein, 2018a). Thus, in contrast with traditional paternalism,
which aims to improve individuals’ welfare as the paternalist judges the
matter, nudging is more constrained. A traditionally paternalistic policy, for
instance, may discourage individuals from smoking marijuana or driving a
car without wearing a seatbelt because policy-makers believe these activities
are harmful to those engaging in them. Such paternalistic polices are not
based on the subjective preferences of their targets, which may or may not
agree with policy-makers’ views. Furthermore, an individual wishing to
smoke marijuana or intending to drive without a seatbelt may engage in
these acts either based on a full understanding of the risks involved or due to
some misunderstanding of said risks on her part. In either case, however, the
subjective beliefs or preferences of the targeted individuals have only a
limited bearing on the policy’s desirability from the perspective of the paternalist policy-makers, who believe they know better.6
Nudges are different, involving only a paternalism of means rather than the
traditional paternalism of ends (Sunstein, 2013). But making people subjectively better off as these people judge the matter requires policy-makers to be
attuned to individuals’ beliefs and preferences. This goal still leaves room for
paternalistic interventions, because people may wish to act one way – say, to
avoid smoking marijuana – yet ﬁnd it difﬁcult to implement their preferred
course of behavior. Individuals may also neglect to take actions they would
have liked to take, such as failing to wear a seatbelt while driving, due to
lapses of attention rather than following conscious decisions. Additionally,
people can beneﬁt from paternalistic interventions when they hold erroneous

5 For a related but distinct approach, see Camerer et al. (2003).
6 Some traditional paternalists may consider individuals’ subjective beliefs and preferences as one
of many factors that affect these individuals’ overall well-being, but neither as the main factor in their
calculus nor as a determinative one.
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beliefs that lead them to intentional acts that in fact conﬂict with their own preferences. For example, some individuals who consciously refrain from wearing
a seatbelt while driving may do so only because they underestimate the risks
involved. Had they been fully cognizant of these risks, these actors would
have worn a seatbelt, so an intervention that leads them to do so may
improve their subjective welfare.
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) believe that the goal of advancing individuals’
subjective welfare is best achieved by employing a limited set of nudging
tools “that alter people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding
any option or signiﬁcantly changing their economic incentives” (Thaler &
Sunstein, 2008, p. 6). Such choice-preserving tools are only a subset of the
many policy instruments available even to strict means-paternalists, who can
also employ, in principle, any of the more coercive policy tools that traditional
ends-paternalism often adopts. To illustrate, a means-paternalist who believes
that individuals fail to wear seatbelts only because they underestimate the risks
involved can mandate that drivers wear seatbelts and penalize drivers who fail
to comply.
Determining which tools are best suited to improving subjective welfare in
any particular case would have been simple if means-paternalists were
always and perfectly able to identify people’s beliefs and preferences.
Possessing full information and facing no risk of error, such policy-makers
could have employed the most efﬁcient tools available to them, accounting
for the efﬁcacy of alternative policies and their attendant costs. Efﬁcacy considerations, for instance, often favor more coercive policies such as mandates or
bans accompanied by sanctions for violation, which can be quite effective in
changing behavior (cf. Zamir, 1998). At the same time, the implementation
of these coercive policies often involves substantial enforcement costs
(Sibony & Alemanno, 2016). Choice-preserving policies, on the other hand,
may be less efﬁcacious, since by design they allow individuals to act contrary
to those true preferences that we assume the means-paternalist policy-makers
to have identiﬁed. At the same time, such policies may be attractive due to
their relatively low implementation costs, since enforcement is unnecessary
when choice is preserved.7
In reality, however, means-paternalists may err when grappling with the
daunting challenge of determining individuals’ subjective beliefs and preferences (Rizzo & Whitman, 2009; Sunstein, 2014), a task that ends-paternalists

7 The implementation of choice-preserving policies may entail other substantial costs, such as
when information needs to be disseminated widely, but the question of implementation costs is not
germane to the present analysis.
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are largely exempt from. Because policy-makers do not have direct access to
this subjective information, they must infer it from observed conduct or statements, policy-relevant research and similar sources. Such inferences are inevitably fallible, however, and the adoption of policies seeking to advance the
wrong preferences can impose substantial additional social costs. Meanspaternalists must therefore also account for error costs, in addition to
efﬁcacy and implementation costs, when selecting their policy tools.
Once error costs are considered, though, nudges seem to hold the upper hand
relative to ‘hard’ policies. Due to their more coercive nature, the latter tools
offer only limited feedback, if any, about policy-makers’ successes in identifying individuals’ preferences. In the rare, extreme cases in which even ‘hard’ policies fail to change the behavior of their targets, individuals’ resistance likely
indicates a dramatic discrepancy between their own preferences and policymakers’ beliefs about these preferences. More commonly, however, policies
involving greater coercion will successfully change behavior, whether
through legal mandates or bans or via other economic incentives, while offering little insight regarding people’s antecedent preferences. The changes
wrought by such policies may simply reﬂect individuals’ constrained choices
or their responses to altered incentives rather than their subjective views of
what makes them better off. In these common cases, therefore, the information
loss resulting from the employment of more coercive policy instruments entails
the risk of substantial error costs.
In contrast, nudges appear more informative and less costly for meanspaternalists who are concerned about the possibility of error in ascertaining
subjective beliefs and preferences. These choice-preserving policies try to
steer people toward their desired goals while leaving them free to go their
own contrary way. Consequently, the behavior of individuals who accept a
policy intervention that they are free to reject would seem to suggest the
nudge is compatible with their subjective beliefs and preferences. The failure
of a nudge, on the other hand, alerts policy-makers to the possibility they
erred in their judgment of their targets’ subjective perspective, thus allowing
means-paternalists to correct their errors and avoid their long-term costs
(Sunstein, 2017).
The potential error-cost advantage of nudges compared to coercive interventions is even more signiﬁcant once the heterogeneity of preferences is accounted
for. Different people hold different preferences in all policy-relevant domains of
human behavior, from health and ﬁnances to labor, leisure and more. This heterogeneity makes the task of means-paternalists particularly difﬁcult, since no
single policy can advance the subjective well-being of all of its targets.
Furthermore, the selection of speciﬁc policies faces an even greater challenge
in the many common cases that require decision-makers to trade off different
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values against one another. Most people, for example, prefer larger to smaller
retirement savings. In the absence of tradeoffs between an increased rate of
saving for retirement and any other consideration, means-paternalists may
implement policies that help people achieve their desired goal with reasonable
conﬁdence. Yet in reality, individuals who save more of their current income
for retirement inevitably reduce their disposable resources for present consumption, and the relative weight that different people give to savings versus
consumption is bound to vary. Thus, a ‘hard’ measure, such as a mandatory
minimum retirement contribution rate, will increase contribution rates but
reduce the disposable income of employees who were saving less before its
implementation. The effect of the mandate on the employees’ subjective wellbeing will depend on their preferences, however. Those who wished to save
more but failed to do so prior to the mandate will be better off, while their
peers who preferred having more disposable income at present will be subjectively worse off. On the other hand, a choice-preserving default contribution
would allow the employees who wish to save less to do just that, even while
helping those who wish to save more increase their retirement savings.
The preceding analysis helps explains Nudge’s insistence on employing
choice-preserving tools when aiming to improve individual subjective
welfare. When practical, the unique libertarian-paternalistic combination of
goal and tools appears particularly attractive, even apart from any libertarian
commitment to individuals’ freedom of choice. Policies that seek to make individuals better off as they see the matter and use only choice-preserving nudges
should be able to avoid the potentially costly imposition of policy-makers’
sometimes mistaken views of what makes other people better off.

Nudges that fail
As noted, ‘Nudges that fail’ addresses three categories of nudge failure that we
may designate technically deﬁcient nudges, inadequate nudges, and inappropriate nudges. Naturally, the designation of a failed nudge as belonging to a
particular category has signiﬁcant policy implications. We saw that technically
deﬁcient nudges simply require ﬁxing. The actual task of identifying the precise
contours of an effective, improved nudge may be demanding, but policymakers need not be concerned about the normative desirability of nudges
that properly belong to this ﬁrst category.
The clear prescription for inadequate nudges, on the other hand, is to replace
them with more coercive policies. This second category involves interventions
that even committed means-paternalists should ﬁnd normatively justiﬁed
because their success advances subjective welfare regardless of the speciﬁc
tools they employ. Importantly, moreover, a correctly designated, inadequate
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nudge by deﬁnition raises no error-cost concerns; although nudging proved
insufﬁcient to the task, achieving the behavioral change sought by the failed
nudge will make its targets better off. This absence of error costs, in turn, combines with the superior efﬁcacy of harder policy measures to make them a
natural substitute for the failed, softer nudge.
The third category – that of inappropriate nudges – bears a dramatically different prescription. These are cases in which the failure of nudging is diagnostic, informing us that the nudge should never have been attempted. Notably,
unlike the preceding two categories, inappropriate nudges take place only
when policy-makers’ initial assessment of individuals’ beliefs or preferences
was erroneous. From the perspective of means-paternalists, the failure of
inappropriate nudges is therefore fortunate. It is a case in which ‘freedom
worked’ (Sunstein, 2017), a case that vindicates the softer touch of the
nudging tools that enable people to make contrary choices without facing
legal or substantial economic costs.
Yet the otherwise-insightful analysis of ‘Nudges that fail’ stops short of
acknowledging the critical challenge of appropriately categorizing failed
nudges. In other words, even means-paternalists who fully endorse the distinction proposed here among technically deﬁcient, inadequate, and inappropriate
nudges are left with no clear guidance on how to determine which category a
given failed nudges properly belongs to. The article does seem to suggest in
passing a number of solutions to this challenge, including relying on policymakers’ judgments of what makes other people better off and ascertaining
whether the nudge failed due to its targets’ strong antecedent preferences or
because of some judgmental bias on their part. However, further reﬂection
reveals the problematic nature of all of these solutions.
The suggestion that even following the failure of a nudge we continue to rely
on policy-makers’ judgments of individuals’ preferences, particularly for lowcost nudges or nudges that address signiﬁcant problems, is troublesome.
Concluding that a failure is not diagnostic simply because policy-makers
believe they know better altogether negates the very error-cost advantage of
nudging compared to harder interventions. Indeed, once adopted, such a conclusion risks turning means-paternalists into the same ends-paternalists from
whom they seek to distinguish themselves. It is still possible, of course, that
these policy-makers have correctly identiﬁed individuals’ preferences, but the
intuitions of means-paternalists offer a thin reed to hold on to in the face of
a nudge that failed due to something other than its technical deﬁciency.
Furthermore, a continued reliance on policy-makers’ judgment of what
people really want would still fail to discriminate between technically
deﬁcient nudges and inadequate nudges. Perhaps the implied suggestion is
that conﬁdent means-paternalists should follow a failed nudge with further
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nudging attempts and switch to a harder intervention only if these further
nudges continue to fail. Such a practice is unattractive, however, since it
involves continued lower-efﬁcacy, soft interventions in situations that render
their error-cost advantage irrelevant because policy-makers already believe
they have nothing new to learn about their targets’ subjective preferences.
Instead, assuming their nudge already was reasonably designed, those who
are conﬁdent in their subjective welfare judgments will be better served by
adopting more coercive policies immediately on the heels of the failed nudge.
The difﬁculty with continuing to rely on policy-makers’ own judgments following the failure of nudging is obvious, however. Means-paternalists who are
genuinely concerned about the risk of misjudging their targets’ preferences will
be unlikely to abandon their concern in the face of potential evidence that a
failed nudge so usefully offers for precisely such a mistake. Their counterparts
who believe that they are not prone to error, on the other hand, need not await
the failure of a nudge to adopt more coercive policies and will see little beneﬁt
in the choice-preserving tools of nudging to begin with (Conly, 2013).
A second, more attractive approach to distinguishing among the three failed
nudging categories is to determine whether a given failure reﬂects individuals’
strong antecedent preferences or is rather due to their lingering judgment
errors. ‘Nudges that fail’ suggests the relevance of this approach when it discusses both examples of nudges that apparently failed due to robust antecedent
preferences and other cases in which a failure may be attributed to individuals’
naturally arising or induced biases. The former examples are the poster children of a diagnostic failure. The subjective well-being of unbiased individuals
who refuse to be nudged for the right reasons cannot be improved through
further intervention, and means-paternalists will happily leave these people
to their own devices.
In contrast, nudges that fail at least in part due to people’s biased judgments
present a more complicated picture. Such policies in fact may turn out to
belong to any of the three categories of technically deﬁcient, inadequate or
inappropriate nudges. To illustrate the challenge of properly categorizing failures involving biased judgments, let us return to the case of a company that
wishes to help its employees increase their retirement saving by using a
default retirement contribution rate (e.g., 6% of salary). Assume that most
employees opt out of the default and choose instead to save a smaller percentage of their employment income, but the company is unsure as to the precise
reasons for the failure of the nudge. The company also ﬁnds evidence that
many of its employees manifest one or more biases that lead them either to
overweight present versus far-future consumption in retirement or to overestimate their likely cumulative savings at retirement as a function of their current
contribution rate. For example, these employees may be present-biased,
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hyperbolic discounters or, alternatively, just overoptimistic about the longterm performance of their retirement investment portfolio.
Notably, in either case, it does not sufﬁce for the company to determine that
its employees are biased. As long as the magnitude of the employees’ errors,
their effect on the decision to opt out from the retirement contribution
default, and the impact of employee preferences for present versus retirement
consumption are unknown, the company will not be able properly to categorize the nudge’s failure. It may be, for example, that the failure is wholly or
mostly due to the employees’ biased judgments, in which case the company
would have to decide whether to attempt to debias these judgments so that
the nudge will work, essentially treating the failure as a technically deﬁcient
nudge. Alternatively, the company might accept the bias as given and replace
what it views as an inadequate nudge with a mandatory contribution rate.
Yet the employees’ behavior could also be signiﬁcantly driven by strong antecedent preferences for present consumption, regardless of their judgment bias.
In the latter case, however, even fully debiased employees will continue to opt
out of the default, and so the company has attempted an inappropriate nudge.
At any rate, the broader and more signiﬁcant point is that even reliable evidence that a bias contributed to the nudge’s failure bears unclear ramiﬁcations
without additional information. Policy-makers who can further determine the
relative impact of biased judgments on the failure of a nudge compared to the
role played by individuals’ antecedent preferences will have a clearer path
forward. Yet such information is difﬁcult to come by and unlikely to be available for most failed nudges. Rather, a more likely ﬁnding that biased judgments
made some contribution to the failure of a nudge would not signiﬁcantly ameliorate the challenge of correctly categorizing the failure in order to determine
the appropriate follow-up policy response.
Finally, the already difﬁcult task of categorizing failed nudges is further complicated by the limited correlation between the strength of individuals’ antecedent preferences and their resilience to nudging. Sunstein (2017) makes the
intuitively appealing argument that the strength of individuals’ antecedent preferences should manifest in their resilience to nudging, at least in the absence of
judgmental biases. On this account, people with strong preferences ﬁnd a contrary nudge more costly (whether consciously or intuitively) and therefore
resist it, while those who possess only weak antecedent preferences, or none
at all, succumb to the same nudge. If this were the case, all properly designed
nudges directed at unbiased targets would have had the salubrious effect of
advancing the subjective welfare of individuals not possessing contrary preferences while allowing those holding contrary preferences to go their own way
with minimal impediments.
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Yet behavioral research clearly contradicts this intuition, showing that there
is substantial heterogeneity in individuals’ tendencies to approximate the
assumptions of rationality or deviate from them (Stanovich et al., 2008). The
empirical evidence ﬁnds, moreover, that intra-individual correlations in the
manifestation of different behavioral phenomena are quite low (Tor, 2014,
2015). Hence, for example, an overoptimistic decision-maker may be impervious to framing effects. Decision-makers’ susceptibility to nudging generally
and defaults speciﬁcally will vary greatly, depending inter alia on the individual
and the speciﬁc nudging technique employed. The joint effects of heterogeneity
in both domains of preferences and rationality thus mean that individuals’
reactions to nudging will not reliably reﬂect the strength of their antecedent
preferences with any reliability. In the illustration of a company’s retirement
contribution policy, employees who are largely unaffected by defaults may
opt out despite holding very weak antecedent preferences for current consumption, contributing to the nudge’s failure.8
All in all, the challenge facing any effort to categorize failed nudges properly
is substantial, particularly once the limits of the information that policy-makers
are likely to possess even in the best of cases are taken into account. It is the
difﬁculty of properly categorizing failed nudges, therefore, rather than the
more straightforward normative implications of properly categorized failures,
that should be the primary concern of committed means-paternalists.

Nudges that should fail?
The preceding analysis highlighted the challenge of properly categorizing failed
nudges, showing that neither policy-makers’ beliefs about the subjective
welfare of others nor their efforts to distinguish bias-driven from preferencewrought failures are likely to offer reliable guidance for post-failure policy
selection. Another challenge that ‘Nudges that fail’ stops short of addressing –
namely, the problem of determining the normative desirability of nudges that
have succeeded – is even more troubling, however.
Why should means-paternalists be concerned about the desirability of successful nudges? The answer is simple: Successful nudges, just like failed ones,
may turn out to be inappropriate. Unlike the other two categories of technically
deﬁcient and inadequate nudges, which apply only to failed nudges, the question of whether a nudge should have been attempted to begin with – namely, of

8 The opposite and normatively more troubling pattern, in which employees who are more susceptible to the effects of defaults are successfully nudged even when they hold contrary preferences,
is discussed below.
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potentially inappropriate nudges – applies to successful ones as well, and with
greater force. To wit, the failure of a nudge at least alerts policy-makers to the
possibility that the nudge was inappropriate, the difﬁculty of properly categorizing the failure notwithstanding. Yet the same cannot be said of successful
nudges, which may succeed in changing the behavior of individuals who
hold contrary antecedent preferences without leaving any indication of their
inappropriateness.
Successful nudges can sometimes override the preferences of individuals
whose pre-nudge judgments are biased in a direction that makes the nudge
appear to promote their preferences when its actual effect is to the contrary.
To illustrate, an employee who underestimates the beneﬁts of compound interest for the long-term growth of her retirement savings may retain the high
default contribution rate set by the company because she erroneously believes
she must save more now to maintain her preferred level of retirement savings.
In this case, by leading her to save too much and consume too little at present,
the successful default contribution nudge diminishes the employee’s subjective
welfare instead of advancing it.
Although the concern that some previously biased individuals are susceptible
to inappropriate nudges is real, its practical effects are likely to be limited. After
all, those whose judgments are biased in a direction that makes them excessively likely to be nudged successfully will also be more likely to make
choices that diminish their subjective welfare even in the absence of the
nudge. The employee who underestimates the expected growth of their longterm savings, for example, will tend to save excessively regardless of the
employer’s adoption of any contribution default. Nonetheless, a more
passive employee or one who is only modestly biased may end up saving excessively at present only when nudged in that direction, but not if they are left to
their own devices.
The problem of bias-based susceptibility to mistaken nudging is more signiﬁcant, however, for those individuals who are biased by the nudge itself.
Speciﬁcally, some people may accede to nudges partly because they believe
them to convey valid information about desirable behavior.9 For instance, an
employee facing a 6% default contribution may infer that this level of contribution is necessary to reach her retirement savings goals and therefore allow
herself to be nudged. Yet if this employee’s goals are achievable with a lower

9 Some nudges may also seem to convey information that changes people’s preferences rather
than only shape their beliefs, as discussed below. A nudge that appears to convey a prevailing
social norm, for instance, may lead some individuals to change their preferences so that they better
align with that norm (cf. Bar-Gill et al., 2018).
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contribution (e.g., 4%), the successful nudge will diminish her net present
income and thus reduce rather than increase her subjective welfare.
Yet another problematic case involves inappropriate nudges that successfully
change the behavior of individuals who hold contrary preferences not only
prior to but even following the nudge. At ﬁrst blush, such inappropriate
success may seem implausible given the choice-preserving nature of nudges.
Since the nudged are free to go their own way without bearing substantial economic costs, one might expect those whose preferences disagree with the nudge
simply to disregard it. Indeed, the freedom of contrary choice feature of
nudging is its hallmark advantage over traditional, more coercive policy
tools such as mandates, bans or taxes (Sunstein, 2014, 2017). Moreover,
empirical studies of nudging often show evidence of some nudge-resistant
choices, as when individuals opt out of default arrangements (Beshears et al.,
2010; Willis, 2013).
A closer look reveals, however, that nudges can alter behavior and override
individuals’ antecedent preferences even while preserving their targets’
nominal freedom of choice. To understand how this can happen, we should
recall that many nudges succeed by employing behavioral tools that are only
(or mostly) efﬁcacious because of individuals’ bounded rationality. This is
the case with nudges that inﬂuence judgment processes, such as those that
rely on anchoring or availability, but it also true for nudges that directly
impact choice behavior. Nudges that shape choice by exploiting, for
example, ordering or context effects, framing effects or loss aversion (for a
more extensive list, see Sunstein, 2016) by deﬁnition affect only boundedly
rational individuals. The hypothetical, perfectly rational actor – the imaginary
breed that Thaler and Sunstein (2008) designate ‘Econs’ – would have made
the same choices regardless of the order in which options were presented,
their context, frame and so on. In fact, the behavioral research program that
over the last half-century has documented most of the phenomena that today
are advanced as potential reasons for nudging, as well as useful nudging
tools, is largely based on a systematic study of how actual human judgment
and decision-making differ from the implicit assumptions and explicit
axioms of rational choice (Goldstein & Hogarth, 1997).
The same bounded rationality of real individuals, which opens the door to so
many forms of efﬁcacious nudging, also means that inappropriate nudges may
succeed by transforming their targets’ antecedent preferences or simply overriding them (Tor, 2016, 2017). For instance, some boundedly rational employees may be successfully nudged toward higher retirement contribution rates
even when they hold antecedent preferences for more consumption and therefore a lower savings rate at present (cf. Johnson & Goldstein, 2013). In this
case, the default contribution nudge may be effective because it changes the
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preferences of these employees, who now truly wish to consume less of their
income and save more for retirement. Such an outcome, in which a nudge
transforms its targets’ preferences, is inappropriate since nudging seeks to
make people better off as they see the matter, rather than to change their
views concerning what makes them better off.10
Alternatively, the default contribution may nudge some employees to
increase their savings even though they retain their antecedent preference for
higher present consumption and a concomitantly lower saving rate. This
outcome is inappropriate for a different and obvious reason – that is,
because the nudge indisputably reduces the subjective welfare of its targets.
Such inappropriate nudging may be successful when people hold weak or
imperfectly formed preferences or because some of the targeted individuals
are more susceptible to the particular nudge’s inﬂuence.
Though still troubling, the former case is perhaps of lesser concern because
interventions that override weak or imperfectly formed preferences are less
likely to cause substantial reductions in subjective welfare. A successfully
nudged individual who only slightly prefers an alternative outcome, or who
merely thinks she probably prefers that other outcome, may face a smaller
gap between her subjective preference and her post-nudge behavior than one
whose preferences signiﬁcantly and clearly diverge from her post-nudge behavior. To illustrate, an employee who retains a 6% contribution default when she
would have slightly preferred contributing only 5%, or thinks she probably
would have preferred to contribute only 4%, is likely better off than one
who is certain she would have preferred to contribute only 4%.
A nudge may succeed in changing the behavior of some individuals who
retain their contrary antecedent preferences because different people are differently susceptible to behavioral interventions. Research already mentioned
reveals much heterogeneity in the degree to which decision-makers approximate
rational judgment and decision-making. In other words, individuals’ bounded
rationality manifests differently with respect to different behavioral phenomena, in different contexts and times and so on (Tor, 2014). Consequently,
two different, unbiased individuals with similar antecedent preferences may

10 One might also argue that the nudge promotes these individuals’ subjective welfare as measured by their actual preferences following the nudge (Zamir & Medina, 2010; Sunstein, 2018a).
Yet, though a systematic analysis of the status of preferences ex post nudge versus ex ante nudge is
outside the scope of the present article, note that counting interventions that change individuals’ preferences as nudges vitiates much of the advantage of the subjective welfare standard in disciplining
potential nudges, whatever other merits such preference-transforming interventions may possess
(Lehwinson-Zamir, 2015). This approach also opens the door to public choice concerns regarding
the potential employment of nudging to manipulate citizens’ preferences (Glaeser, 2006) and
related critiques (Rizzo & Whitman, 2009).
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Notre Dame Law Library, on 29 Jan 2020 at 15:06:01, subject to the
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/bpp.2019.5

16

AVISHALOM TOR

well respond differently to a nudge in a direction that is contrary to these preferences, one resisting the nudge even while the other succumbs to it. For this
reason, the success of any given nudge in changing the behavior of its unbiased
targets depends not only on the existence, direction and strength of their antecedent preferences, but also on their susceptibility to the particular nudge that
means-paternalists decide to employ.
Therefore, the ultimate population of those who are successfully nudged in
any given case is likely composed of three subgroups that policy-makers will
ﬁnd difﬁcult to distinguish from one another: (1) those whose antecedent preferences are aligned with the nudge; (2) those holding weak or imperfectly formed
contrary preferences; and (3) those who are more susceptible to the particular
method of nudging and therefore change their behavior despite retaining their
clear contrary antecedent preferences. The ﬁrst of these groups involves cases
of desirable, appropriate nudging; the second group includes those somewhat
troubling, borderline instances; but the third group is the most problematic,
since it is composed of cases of unquestionably inappropriate nudging.
Returning to our familiar retirement contribution default example, a
company adopting the 6% default may ﬁnd that most employees do not opt
out and that overall employee retirement savings increase as a result. If postnudge behavior were a reliable indicator of antecedent preferences, the
company could have reasonably concluded that its nudging effort was both
successful and appropriate. However, given the heterogeneity in its employees’
susceptibility to the default rule nudge, the company does not know whether
the subjective welfare of a signiﬁcant portion of those who were successfully
nudged perhaps was decreased, rather than increased.
All in all, the challenge posed by the need to identify correctly instances of
inappropriate yet successful nudging is substantial. Successful nudges may be
inappropriate because their success is due their targets’ extant or nudgeinduced bias. They may also be inappropriate because they have succeeded
by transforming – or simply overriding – the preferences of the very individuals
whose subjective welfare means-paternalists wish to promote. Much like in the
case of nudges that fail, moreover, policy-makers will ﬁnd it difﬁcult to distinguish these varieties of inappropriate, successful nudges from their desirable,
appropriate counterparts. However, unlike nudges that fail, whose failure at
least reveals the need to assess their appropriateness, nudges that succeed
offer no such signal. The very sought-after success of the latter provides
neither a negative nor a positive indication of their desirability, leaving the conscientious means-paternalist wondering whether these successful nudges
should have failed.
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The way forward
Policy-makers wishing to promote individuals’ subjective welfare face a conundrum. On the one hand, true nudging promises to be a superior means for
helping make people ‘better as they judge the matter’ compared to traditional,
more coercive regulatory instruments. On the other hand, even well-informed,
conscientious means-paternalists cannot reliably distinguish failed nudges that
should have succeeded and thus ought to be ﬁxed from those undesirable ones
whose failure is diagnostic. Moreover, the identiﬁcation of successful nudges
that should never have been attempted is an even greater challenge.
Nudge skeptics facing this conundrum may quickly conclude that faithful
nudging is impossible, since one cannot reliably advance individuals’ subjective
welfare through choice-preserving behavioral interventions. Some of these
skeptics will take this conclusion further to justify a rejection of both ‘libertarian paternalism’ and its tools, while others may determine that even meanspaternalists should routinely employ traditional ‘hard’ regulation.
Yet there is a way forward even for committed subjective welfarists.
Speciﬁcally, the following paragraphs brieﬂy describe two related, more measured responses to the challenge involved in determining which nudges are
best suited to helping make people better off as they see the matter. The ﬁrst
of these involves narrowing the deﬁnition of appropriate nudging tools,
while the second solution requires policy-makers to subject nudges to a behaviorally informed cost–beneﬁt analysis.11

Narrowing the nudge deﬁnition: the rationality standard
In response to the problem that some interventions can be normatively
undesirable even while they nominally preserve choice, a ﬁrst solution
(‘the rationality standard’) limits the privileged position claimed by nudges
to a narrower set of behavioral tools that includes only interventions that
are rationality-promoting or rationality-enabling. The former aim to help
decision-makers make more rational judgments or decisions, most notably
by means of debiasing (Jolls & Sunstein, 2006; Tor, 2008). For instance, if
some employees save too little because they underestimate the resources
they will need upon retirement, policy-makers can try to foster more realistic
assessments of these needs by addressing the sources of the bias. The success
of such interventions should lead the newly debiased employees to increase
their current savings rates.
11 The following summary descriptions of the two solutions are based on Tor (2016, 2017) and
Tor (2015, 2019), respectively.
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Notably, those rationality-promoting nudges that policy-makers who are
concerned with subjective welfare may adopt are less likely to diminish individuals’ subjective well-being than interventions that merely preserve choice.12
When the former reduce judgment biases or violations of rational choice,
they lead to a better alignment of subjective judgments with objective reality
or a greater consistency in choice behavior, either of which effect tends to
improve individuals’ subjective welfare.13
On the other hand, a rationality-enabling nudge may involve providing
employees with clear information about the many beneﬁts of increased
savings or making it easier for them to increase their salary contribution
rate. More generally, nudges that do not seek to make people behave more
rationally per se can nevertheless make them better off by offering useful information, simplifying their decision-making process or in other ways making the
judgment and decision environment within which they operate more hospitable (cf. Klayman & Brown, 1993). By creating a more rationality-friendly
environment, these nudges increase the likelihood that individuals’ ultimate
decisions will improve their subjective well-being.
The rationality standard for nudging is therefore quite attractive. Yet a
perusal of the numerous methods of nudging proposed in the literature
(Sunstein, 2016) quickly reveals that many of these choice-preserving
tools are neither rationality-promoting nor even rationality-enabling.
The most problematic of these methods seek actively to diminish rationality. They draw on familiar behavioral phenomena, particularly but not
exclusively from the domain of judgmental heuristics, with the goal of
shaping choices by making individuals biased (or more biased, as the
case may be).
Biasing nudges, for example, may recruit the availability heuristic or anchoring to bias people’s judgment in the direction desired by policy-makers. To
illustrate, particularly graphic descriptions of the results of insufﬁcient retirement savings or repeated exposure to stories depicting rare cases of extremely

12 While improved rationality can sometimes diminish subjective welfare – as when people are
potentially better off retaining their mildly overoptimistic perceptions (Taylor & Brown, 1988) –
policy-makers concerned with making people subjectively better off will not seek to implement
such nudges.
13 Rationality-promoting nudges will not always beneﬁt their targets in the short term,
despite their beneﬁcial tendencies overall. For instance, when individuals act contrary to their
subjective well-being due to more than one behavioral factor (e.g., multiple judgment biases or
a combination of a bias and a rational choice violation), remediating one source of bias may
still fail to change their behavior. Occasionally, moreover, correcting only one of multiple
error sources might even lead decision-makers to behave in ways that diminish their subjective
welfare (Tor, 2017).
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negative outcomes for retirees with insufﬁcient savings may lead employees to
overestimate the risks involved in having insufﬁcient savings upon retirement.
The nudge would appear successful if it leads these employees to increase their
retirement contribution rates. Nonetheless, this apparent success is due to the
nudge-induced bias on the part of the employees, who are saving more now
only because they overestimate their needs upon retirement.
The success of such biasing nudging would be troubling. Admittedly, it can
make subjectively better off those employees who saved insufﬁciently because
of a prior failure of rationality (say, because they were overoptimistic about
their expected income stream until retirement), bringing their actual contribution rate closer to what they would have chosen if they were unbiased.14 At the
same time, however, other previously unbiased employees now may increase
their contributions excessively, with a concomitant reduction in their subjective
well-being.
Yet the harms generated by rationality-diminishing interventions go
beyond their complex and sometimes contradictory impacts on the speciﬁc
behaviors they target. For one, a reduction in the rationality of speciﬁc judgment or decision processes may negatively impact individuals’ welfare in
related areas.15 An employee who overestimates the risks she is likely to
face upon retirement, for example, may go beyond increasing her saving
rates and excessively invest in other means of risk reduction, such as
paying for objectively unattractive insurance products. In addition to negative spillover effects of this sort, moreover, attempts to make individuals
better off by misleading them provide the opportunity for using similar
manipulative methods to advance other policy ends beyond means-paternalism. They also risk legitimating such manipulation among policy-makers,
opening the door to familiar public choice critiques of behaviorally
informed policies. Finally, individuals are likely to be less supportive of policies that seek to bias them compared to policies that use other methods of
nudging.16
A great many nudges, however, fall somewhere between rationality-diminishing interventions and their rationality-enabling or rationality-promoting
counterparts. These common nudges exploit individuals’ bounded rationality

14 There is also no guarantee that the contributions of these doubly biased employees will better
approximate their behavior if they were unbiased than their pre-nudge biased contribution rates.
15 This concern is distinct from the question of whether diminishing the rationality of one process
may negatively affect the target individuals’ rationality more generally or create moral hazard problems (e.g., Klick & Mitchell, 2006).
16 These problems may be compounded by signiﬁcant non-welfarist concerns that are outside the
scope of the present analysis.
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to accomplish their goals, without diminishing it further. They frequently draw
on the various ways in which contextual and situational factors impact choice,
including order effects, framing, loss aversion, status quo bias, default effects
and more.
Insofar as they do not actively bias their targets’ judgment and decision processes, nudges that only exploit individuals’ bounded rationality tend to be
less harmful than rationality-diminishing ones. But bounded rationalityexploiting nudges still risk some of the harms generated by rationality-diminishing interventions. Most notably, as discussed above, such nudges can be
successful even when they are normatively undesirable. Bounded rationalityexploiting nudges can transform the preferences or change the choice behavior
of some individuals even when they run contrary to their antecedent preferences, all while providing policy-makers with no evidence that such deleterious effects are occurring.
In addition, efﬁcacious nudges of this sort may also generate some negative
spillovers resembling those of rationality-diminishing policies. This is particularly true for interventions that successfully transform preferences (Barnes
Truelove et al., 2014; Dolan & Galizzi, 2015). Individuals who follow their
new, post-nudge preferences not only reduce their subjective welfare directly
(as measured by their antecedent preferences), but also risk distorting their
choices in other related contexts. Imagine, for instance, an employee who
has been successfully nudged toward weighing their retirement income more
heavily compared to present consumption. This employee may well manifest
her transformed preferences in other behaviors, perhaps reducing her current
consumption beyond what is necessitated by the increased retirement contributions, reducing the risk level of her investment portfolio and so on. However,
these post-nudge behaviors all run contrary to her antecedent preferences and
therefore lower her subjective well-being.17
Policy-makers may also ﬁnd nudges that exploit people’s bounded rationality to be irresistible tools for use in advancing goals beyond subjective welfare,
albeit with more limited attendant risks than in the case of rationality-diminishing nudges. For one, those who routinely employ nudges that incidentally
transform or override some individuals’ preferences may become inured to
this concern and thus be more willing intentionally to draw on the same
tools to advance paternalistic or social welfare goals that run contrary to
their targets’ subjective preferences. And, in a similar vein, the employment

17 Spillovers are also possible for interventions that achieve behavioral change while overriding
rather than transforming preferences, albeit likely to a lesser extent given the psychological mechanisms that likely produce these effects. For further discussion, see Tor (2019).
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Notre Dame Law Library, on 29 Jan 2020 at 15:06:01, subject to the
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/bpp.2019.5

Nudges that should fail? 21

of bounded rationality-exploiting nudges also increases public choice concerns
more generally.
Whatever its shortcomings, however, nudging that exploits the bounded
rationality of its targets also differs from rationality-diminishing interventions
in being a seemingly inevitable aspect of the decision environment (or ‘choice
architecture’) in certain instances. Nudge’s well-known example of arranging
cafeteria shelves in a way that increases the likelihood that children eating
there will choose more healthful food options (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) is a
case in point. After all, the hypothetical cafeteria manager must somehow
arrange the food shelves and, by assumption, her chosen arrangement will
shape the children’s choices. Once she is aware of the effect of the arrangement,
therefore, the question the manager faces is only how to nudge – that is, how to
arrange the shelves – rather than whether to nudge.
Yet the challenge faced by such policy-makers, who cannot avoid
design decisions that impact behavior by exploiting individuals’ bounded
rationality, is not unique. Indeed, whether avoidable or not, a conscientious
welfarist would subject all behavioral nudges to some form of a cost–beneﬁt
analysis.

A cost–beneﬁt analysis of nudging
In lieu of narrowing the deﬁnition of true nudges to exclude choice-preserving
interventions that diminish rationality and perhaps even those that merely
exploit bounded rationality, the second solution involves subjecting all behavioral policies to a cost–beneﬁt analysis (CBAB). The proposed analysis need not
be extensive in every case. Low-risk policies such as rationality-promoting
nudges and most rationality-enabling interventions will usually pass the test
with only a brief examination, although the substantial difﬁculties involved
in making them effective or ﬁnding a practical way to implement them may
occasionally still generate costs that exceed their beneﬁts.
On the other hand, the costs of those more problematic forms of nudging
that exploit individuals’ bounded rationality or even actively diminish rationality should be routinely weighed against their beneﬁts before they are implemented. Notably, the idea of subjecting these nudges to a CBAB runs
contrary to one of their important, oft-claimed beneﬁts compared to traditional, costly policy tools – namely, that nudges can generally achieve signiﬁcant behavior change at a low cost (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). A related,
largely implicit argument is that the costs of nudges are so low compared to
their potential beneﬁts that policy-makers need not subject them to the same
cost–beneﬁt analysis that is required for determining whether other regulatory
interventions are likely to promote social welfare (Adler & Posner, 2006;
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Sunstein 2018b). Yet, the preceding discussion made clear that, whatever their
beneﬁts, choice-preserving nudges can still impose signiﬁcant costs on some of
their targets.18
Proponents of nudging correctly recognize that such policies typically
carry much lower direct price tags than those of the more traditional
policy tools of economic incentives, mandates or bans (Thaler & Sunstein,
2008; Sibony & Alemanno, 2016). This low-cost intuition stems in part
from a focus on the government side of the ledger, which suggests that
choice-preserving policies – which by design demand that individuals be
free to go their own way if they wish to do so once a nudge is implemented
– entail no enforcement costs.19 Moreover, the targets’ freedom of choice
also appears to minimize the costs of introducing erroneous nudges, if not
for the problems discussed earlier.
In addition, recall that certain nudges involve the unavoidable selection of
some form of choice architecture. This is the case, for example, when policymakers must offer some default arrangement, such as an opt-in versus an
opt-out option, or even a forced choice among the available options. But the
same is true for many other settings that require disclosure or other types of
information to ﬂow to individuals, or situations that necessitate the use of
forms or procedures as prerequisites for the provision of government services
or during other interactions between citizens and public or private institutions.
In these and similar circumstances, laws, regulations or institutional arrangements usually exist already, so while potential nudges may require their modiﬁcation, the direct costs of such changes to extant arrangements tend to be
small compared to the overall volume of economic activity they affect.
Nudge advocates do recognize that the development and implementation of
efﬁcacious nudges still entail costs (Halpern, 2015). This is, in fact, one important implication of ‘Nudges that fail’, which concludes that learning to nudge
better – namely, the process of experimenting with variants of an attempted
nudge until it works as desired – is often an appropriate response to an
initial nudge failure (Sunstein, 2017). Still, the direct costs of multiple ﬁeld
studies or even attempted full-scale nudges usually pale in comparison to the
potential beneﬁts of a noticeable behavioral change for a substantial
population.

18 This summary account does not address the implications of any further beneﬁts or costs nudges
may impose on third parties (Tor, 2019).
19 In reality, choice-preserving nudges may entail non-negligible enforcement costs. This may be
the case, for instance, when implementation requires the involvement of intermediaries whose interests do not align perfectly with those of the individuals targeted by the policies, as when private companies are required to nudge their employees to increase retirement contributions.
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Notwithstanding their relatively limited direct costs for policy-makers,
however, some nudges can generate substantial costs for their targets.
These costs include, for example, the unintended distortion of some individuals’ behaviors following the nudge. Naturally, the risk of distorted behavior is small where rationality-promoting policies are concerned. As noted
earlier, most nudges that help people overcome their judgment biases, for
instance, increase the likelihood that the resulting choices of these debiased
decision-makers will make them subjectively better off. For similar reasons,
rationality-enabling nudges also usually do not generate signiﬁcant behavioral distortion costs.
The same cannot be said, however, of bounded rationality-exploiting nudges.
As noted earlier, though these policies do not actively make their targets less
rational, they sometimes override or transform antecedent preferences, either of
which outcome makes the subject individuals worse off as they see the matter
(or as they saw it before the nudge). For example, employees who succumb to
a default retirement contribution nudge when they should have opted out will
save too much and consume too little of their current income. When such
nudge-driven distortions affect only a small proportion of the nudged employees,
their ultimate costs will likely be outweighed by the beneﬁts to those other
employees who are successfully and beneﬁcially nudged. But when a nudge distorts the choices of a signiﬁcant fraction of its targets, the beneﬁts it generates
for some may be outweighed by the cost to others.20 Therefore, nudges that
exploit bounded rationality will occasionally generate costly distorted choices
that policy-makers should take into account.
However, where rationality-diminishing nudges are concerned, the risk of
substantial and costly behavioral distortions is even greater. This last and
most problematic class of choice-preserving nudges actively introduces biases
into their targets’ decision processes. Somewhat ironically, to the extent that
they fail or impact only a limited fraction of the targeted individuals, these
nudges are less problematic than they might have been otherwise. But when
and insofar as they are efﬁcacious, such policies risk causing behavioral distortions that exceed those brought about by interventions that only exploit
bounded rationality.
In principle, rationality-diminishing nudges may generate immediate beneﬁts
that outweigh their costs. An employee who previously saved insufﬁciently for
retirement due to one bias – say, an underestimation of the likelihood she
20 The behavior of individuals who are unaffected by the nudge, on the other hand, is unlikely to
generate signiﬁcant additional costs. Those who opt out when they should bear only the minor optout costs, while those who mistakenly opt out when they should have followed the nudge usually are
no worse off than they would have been absent the nudge.
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would be unemployed for some time prior to her planned retirement – may
increase her saving rate toward the appropriate level thanks to a nudge that
successfully biases her in a contrary direction (e.g., by causing her to overestimate her retirement needs). In this case, the contrary nudge that intentionally
creates a further discrepancy between the employee’s judgment and objective
reality nevertheless helps better align her contribution rate with what she
would have chosen if she were wholly unbiased.
Nonetheless, such beneﬁcial outcomes are exceedingly difﬁcult to accomplish in practice. For one, policy-makers who try to ﬁght bias with bias need
to calibrate their newly introduced distortion of their targets’ judgments carefully. In the present case, means-paternalists would need both to assess the
magnitude of the employee’s initial bias and to determine the nature of the
intervention necessary to create a countervailing bias of comparable magnitude. Though theoretically possible, these tasks would pose signiﬁcant challenges even in controlled experimental settings. Where ﬁeld interventions and
the current state of the art are concerned, the likelihood of such calibration
is remote. But without calibration even efﬁcacious rationality-diminishing
nudges will underperform whenever their effects substantially exceed or fall
short of the magnitude of the pre-existing bias whose behavioral effects they
seek to negate. Occasionally, such nudges may even be so effective that they
lead to a greater, if contrary, distortion of their targets’ behavior than the
bias they aimed to counter.
Importantly, moreover, even rationality-diminishing policies that are reasonably calibrated risk generating costly behavioral spillovers. As discussed
earlier, spillovers can occur when the successful introduction of a rationalitydiminishing nudge distorts individuals’ behavior in a related domain, leading
them to make decisions that are contrary to their subjective preferences. To
illustrate, the successfully nudged employee who was led to overestimate her
retirement needs may not only save more for retirement (a beneﬁcial
outcome, if reasonably calibrated), but also engage in additional, costly acts
(e.g., purchasing excess insurance) that make her worse off.
In this respect, therefore, rationality-diminishing interventions tend to be
more costly even than their bounded rationality-exploiting counterparts.
We saw that the latter tend to diminish the subjective welfare of only that
fraction of their targets whose preferences they transform and, sometimes,
of those whose preferences these nudges override. However, rationalitydiminishing policies bias the judgments of all of the targets they successfully
affect. Consequently, the more efﬁcacious these interventions are, the more
costly their potential spillover effects.
More generally, this brief discussion sufﬁces to highlight the potential contribution of CBAB as a means for avoiding the adoption of undesirable nudges or
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for helping discipline the adoption of behaviorally informed interventions to
advance social welfare or traditional paternalistic goals. Policy-makers who
ﬁnd the ﬁrst, simpler solution – of narrowing the nudge deﬁnition to include
only rationality-promoting and rationality-enabling nudges – too constraining
may thus have an alternative. The path of BCBA is more informationally
demanding, requiring assessments of a variety of costs and beneﬁts beyond
those the cost–beneﬁt literature currently recognizes (Weimer, 2017).
Nevertheless, this second solution may permit even committed means-paternalists the use of at least some bounded rationality-exploiting nudges. And
while the employment of rationality-diminishing interventions is less likely to
pass muster even on pure welfarist grounds, it remains theoretically possible
that certain nudges belonging to this category could survive a careful BCBA,
albeit on rare occasions.
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